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Empathy—the capacity to understand and resonatewith the experiences of others—candependon the ability to predictwhenothers are
likely to receive rewards. However, although a plethora of research has examined the neural basis of predictions about the likelihood of
receiving rewards ourselves, very little is known about themechanisms that underpin variability in vicarious reward prediction. Human
neuroimaging and nonhuman primate studies suggest that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) is engaged
when others receive rewards. Does theACCg show specialization for processing predictions about others’ rewards and not one’s own and
does this specialization varywith empathic abilities?We examined hemodynamic responses in the human brain time-locked to cues that
were predictive of a high or low probability of a reward either for the subject themselves or another person. We found that the ACCg
robustly signaled the likelihood of a reward being delivered to another. In addition, ACCg response significantly covaried with trait
emotion contagion, a necessary foundation for empathizing with other individuals. In individuals high in emotion contagion, the ACCg
was specialized for processing others’ rewards exclusively, but for those low in emotion contagion, this region also responded to infor-
mationabout the subject’s own rewards.Our results are the first to show that theACCg signals probabilistic predictions about rewards for
other people and that the substantial individual variability in the degree to which the ACCg is specialized for processing others’ rewards
is related to trait empathy.
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Introduction
The successful prediction of future rewards is fundamental for
adaptive behavior. The neural mechanisms that underpin reward
prediction for oneself are becoming increasingly well understood
(Schultz, 2013). However, during social interactions, stimuli are
often predictors of rewards for others, not exclusively ourselves.
Effectively cooperating, competing, or empathizing with another
requires the ability to compute the value of stimuli that predict
rewards for others (Ruff and Fehr, 2014). However, very little is
known about how vicarious reward predictions are processed in
the brain. Moreover, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding
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Significance Statement
Successfully cooperating, competing, or empathizingwith others can depend on our ability to predict when others are going to get
something rewarding. Althoughmany studies have examined how the brain processes rewards we will get ourselves, very little is
known about vicarious reward processing. Here, we show that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg)
shows a degree of specialization for processing others’ versus one’s own rewards. However, the degree to which the ACCg is
specialized varies with people’s ability to empathize with others. This new insight into how vicarious rewards are processed in the
brain and vary with empathy may be key for understanding disorders of social behavior, including psychopathy and autism.
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how individual differences in social functioning are related to
neural response to others’ reward.
The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) signals predictive
information about reward value, including the probability and
magnitude of future rewards (Shidara and Richmond, 2002; Rog-
ers et al., 2004; Sallet et al., 2007). This region is also engaged
when processing social information (Behrens et al., 2008; Lamm
et al., 2011; Gabay et al., 2014). Recently, a model of the dACC
was proposed that unifies these different facets of its function
(Apps et al., 2013b). This model posits that a subregion of the
ACC in the gyrus (ACCg), lying in the anterior portions of the
midcingulate cortex (areas 24a/24b; Vogt et al., 1995), is sensi-
tive to processing information about rewards for other people,
including probabilistic predictions about rewards that others are
likely to receive (Apps et al., 2013b). Several lines of evidence
support this model. First, there are neurons in the ACCg that
respond when a monkey views cues indicating that another mon-
key will receive a reward (Chang et al., 2013) neurons and in the
dACC that respond when monkeys predict the decisions of a
conspecific in an economic game (Haroush and Williams, 2015).
Second, lesions to the ACCg reduce the value assigned to social
stimuli, leaving the processing of nonsocial stimuli intact (Rude-
beck et al., 2006). Third, hemodynamic responses in this region
vary with the net-value of rewards received by others, the volatil-
ity of social information, predictions about the value of others’
actions, and predictions of social approval from others (Behrens
et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2011; Boorman et al., 2013; Apps and
Ramnani, 2014). Together, these studies point to a central role for
the ACCg in processing information about others’ rewards.
However, a key untested hypothesis from this model is that the
ACCg is engaged when predictions are made about the probabil-
ity of another person receiving a reward. Therefore, the first aim
of our study was to test this hypothesis.
A second hypothesis derived from this model is that individ-
ual differences in social functioning, specifically empathy, vary
with the extent to which ACCg is specialized for processing oth-
ers’ rewards. Empathy can be broadly defined as the capacity to
understand and resonate with the experiences of others (Singer
and Lamm, 2009). Empirical and theoretical accounts have sug-
gested that the ACC is involved in empathizing (Lamm et al.,
2011; Engen and Singer, 2013), but prior work has largely focused
on response of this region to processing others’ pain and other
negative outcomes (for review, see Lamm et al., 2011) rather than
positive, rewarding outcomes. The propensity to feel empathy
varies substantially between individuals (Blair, 2005; Lockwood
et al., 2013a; Bird and Viding, 2014), but the mechanisms that
underpin individual differences in vicariously processing anoth-
er’s rewards are poorly understood. Therefore, the second aim of
our study was to test the hypothesis that the extent to which the
ACCg is specialized for processing others’ rewards is positively
associated with trait empathy.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Thirty-two right-handed healthy males (age 19 –32 years, M  22.7,
SD  3.0) were recruited through university participant databases. Ex-
clusion criteria included previous or current neurological or psychiatric
disorder, non-normal or noncorrected to normal vision, non-native
English language, and previous or current study of psychology. This
latter criterion was used due to concerns that prior experience of study-
ing psychology could compromise participants’ belief in the deception
used in the protocol. Two participants were excluded from the analysis
(one due to excessive motion (10% of scans) and one due to neurolog-
ical abnormalities), leaving a final sample of 30. All participants gave
written informed consent and the study was approved by the local de-
partmental research ethics committee.
Experimental task
Design. We examined the processing of cues that signaled the probability
with which a first-person and a third-person would receive a reward. A
2 2 factorial design, agency (self vs other) and probability (high 80% vs
low 20%), was used to examine activation time-locked to the cues (see
Fig. 1).
On each trial during the experiment, participants saw cues that indi-
cated the probability with which they (first-person or “self”) or the other
participant (third-person or “other”) were likely to win points. These
cues were represented as pie charts to depict the level of probability
explicitly and minimize any requirements for reward learning across the
task. The cues for self and other differed in color, but were luminance
matched. Self cues had the word “you” written above them, whereas
other cues had the name of the other participant (a confederate) written
above them. This ensured that participants were explicitly aware of
whether the cues predicted outcomes for themselves or for the other
participant.
After the cue, an outcome was presented. To ensure attention to the
cues, participants indicated (at the time of the outcome) whether the
outcome was expected or not with a button press. We specifically inves-
tigated passively delivered rather than instrumentally obtained rewards
so that any activation differences between self and other trials could not
be related to differences in motor preparation (e.g., an action on a self
trial but no action on another trial).
Before scanning, participants completed a practice version of the task
during which they received feedback as to whether their judgements
(expected or unexpected) were correct. During scanning, however, par-
ticipants were instructed that they would not receive feedback on their
judgements, but that they should respond as quickly and accurately as
possible to the judgment.
There were 100 trials in total, 50 self trials and 50 other trials presented
in a pseudorandom order, with no more than three trials in a row of self
or other cues. The 50 self trials consisted of 25 trials of high-probability
first-person cues and 25 trials of low-probability first-person cues. Sim-
ilarly, the 50 other trials consisted of 25 high-probability third-person
cues and 25 low-probability first-person cues. For both the self and other
conditions, 20 outcomes were an expected win, 20 outcomes were an
expected no win, five outcomes were an unexpected win, and five out-
comes were an unexpected no win (equivalent to 80%/20% probability).
Trial structure. Each trial began with a cue that signaled the probability
of reward (80%/20%) and agent (self/other) for 800 ms (see Fig. 1A).
After a jittered delay (2500 – 6000 ms), participants observed an outcome
(win 100 points/win 0 points; 800 ms), followed by a variable fixation
(2000 – 4000 ms). Participants were then presented with the options
“yes” or “no” and were required to press one of the two buttons to
indicate whether the outcome was expected or not. The side of the screen
on which these options were presented was counterbalanced so that par-
ticipants could not form a representation of a specific motor command at
any point during a trial. Participants had 1500 ms to indicate their option
or the word “missed” appeared in red on the screen. This was followed by
a fixation cross (1000 –2000 ms).
Procedure. Participants were paired with one of two age-matched con-
federates (who were also male), whom they believed were naive partici-
pants and had never met before the experiment. The participant and the
confederate were instructed together that they could earn extra payment,
based on the outcomes they received during the experimental task (see
below); but in fact all participants were paid the same amount (total £30,
representing an additional £7 to the standard participant payment for
the required time commitment). They also believed that the confederate
participant could earn an extra payment in the same manner during the
task. A set of standardized questions completed after the scan confir-
med that no participant had become suspicious about the deception
during the experiment.
Participants attended two sessions. The first session was attended only
by the experimental participant without a confederate and involved prac-
ticing the experimental task and completing questionnaires. In the first
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session, attended only by the experimental participant, the “other” par-
ticipant was described as “player 2” and the experimental participant was
instructed that, in the scanning session, this name would be replaced by
the name of the other participant. Participants were instructed that, dur-
ing the practice session, the points would not be converted into any
money either for themselves or the other person, but that when they
attended the scanning session, these points would be converted into
additional payment for themselves and the other participant. The second
session (7 d later) was attended by both the experimental participant
and the confederate. During this session, the experimental participant
performed the task while inside the MRI scanner. The experimental par-
ticipant was under the impression that the confederate performed the
same task simultaneously. The confederate was seated in the adjacent
MRI control room to maintain this impression. The participants were
instructed that, regardless of whether the cues and outcomes were for
themselves or for the other person, they should perform the same judg-
ment task to indicate whether the outcome was expected or not. More-
over, participants were not instructed to the specific payoff matrix, which
was in fact equal. This was done to ensure that participants remained
motivated to attend to the cues and outcomes.
After the scanning session, participants rated how positive they felt
when observing themselves or the other person winning on a nine-point
scale ranging from “not at all” to “very positive.” One-sample t tests
showed that, for both self and other, participants felt significantly more
positive than neutral when seeing win outcomes compared with no win
outcomes (other win t(29) 2.1, p 0.05, M 5.4, SD 1.04; self win
t(29)  5.3 p  0.001, M  6.4, SD  1.43), and paired-sample t tests
showed that participants felt significantly more positive when they won
money for themselves compared with seeing the other participant
win (t(29)  4.35, p  0.001). This suggests that participants found it
rewarding to view win outcomes for both themselves and for the other
participant, but felt more positive overall when they viewed themselves
winning.
Questionnaire measures. Participants completed a measure of empathy,
the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et
al., 2011). The QCAE is a multidimensional instrument devised to measure
five key components of empathy. In the development of the QCAE, two
raters selected items from other well validated and commonly used empathy
measures (e.g., Empathy Quotient; Hogan Empathy Scale; the Empathy sub-
scale of the Impulsiveness-Venturesomeness-Empathy Inventory; and the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index) if they were deemed to measure empathy
(see items below). Items deemed to measure other processes (e.g., sympathy)
were not included. The five subscales comprising the QCAE are as follows:
perspective-taking (e.g., “I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a
conversation.”); online simulation (e.g., “Before criticizing somebody, I try
to imagine how I would feel if I was in their place.”); emotion contagion (e.g.,
“I am happy when I am with a cheerful group and sad when the others are
glum.”); peripheral responsivity (e.g., “I often get deeply involved with the
feelings of a character in a film, play, or novel.”); and proximal responsivity
(e.g., “I often get emotionally involved with my friends’ problems”). Items
are rated on a four-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
The QCAE has good construct validity and internal consistency (Reniers et
al., 2011).
Statistical analysis of behavioral data. Behavioral analyses were per-
formed in SPSS 22 software (IBM). An agency (self vs other) by reward
(win vs no win) ANOVA was used to examine reaction time (RT) differ-
ences to outcome judgments. We did not examine the agency (self vs
other) by expectedness (expected vs unexpected) interaction due to the
low number of unexpected outcomes in our design (10 valid trials per
subject). Relationships between behavioral performance and empathy
were assessed using bivariate correlations. We adopted an  level of 0.05
and a power analysis indicated that we had 80% power to detect an
effect size of Cohen’s d 0.50.
Functional neuroimaging data collection and analysis
fMRI data acquisition. A Siemens Avanto 1.5-T MRI scanner was used to
acquire a 5.5 min 3D T1-weighted structural scan and 424 multislice
T2-weighted echoplanar volumes with BOLD contrast. The structural
scan was acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo
sequence. Imaging parameters were as follows: 176 slices; slice thick-
ness 1 mm; gap between slices 0.5 mm; TR 2730 ms; TE 3.57
ms; field of view 256 mm 256 mm2; matrix size 256 256; voxel
size 1 1 1 mm resolution. The echoplanar image (EPI) sequence
was acquired in an ascending manner, at an oblique angle (30°) to the
AC–PC line to decrease the impact of susceptibility artifact in the orbito-
frontal cortex (Deichmann et al., 2003) with the following acquisition
parameters: 424 T2*-weighted echoplanar volumes, 35 2 mm slices, 1
mm slice gap; echo time 50 ms; repetition time 2975 ms; flip angle
90°; field of view 192 mm; matrix size 64 64.
fMRI data analysis. Imaging data were analyzed using SPM8 (www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data preprocessing followed a standard sequence.
The first four volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects
and the last volume was discarded because the experimental task ended
one volume before the end of the scanning sequence. The removal of the
last volume ensured that no hemodynamic response (which typically
occurs 4 – 6 s after event onset) to the desktop screen was sampled. Im-
ages were then realigned and coregistered to the participant’s own ana-
tomical image. The anatomical image was processed using a unified
segmentation procedure combining segmentation, bias correction, and
spatial normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) tem-
plate using SPM’s New Segment procedure (Ashburner and Friston,
2005); the same normalization parameters were then used to normalize
the EPI images. The images were resampled to a voxel size of 1.5 1.5
1.5 mm. Finally, a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum
was applied to spatially smooth the images. Before the study, first-level
design matrices were examined to ensure that estimable GLMs could be
performed with independence between all regressors with correlation
coefficients of r0.25.
First-level analysis. Nine (in some subjects, 10) event types were used to
construct regressors in which event onsets were convolved with the syn-
thetic canonical hemodynamic response function in SPM and associated
responses were estimated in the context of the general linear model. Each
of the four conditions (self high probability, self low probability, other
high probability, other low probability) at the time of the cue and at the
time of the outcome was modeled as a separate regressor for correct
responses. The onset of the judgment was also modeled in a single regres-
sor across all event types. An additional regressor modeled trials in which
the judgment was missed or participants made an error. For those par-
ticipants whose head motion caused visible image corruption in partic-
ular scans, an extra regressor was included. These images were removed
and replaced with an image created by interpolating the two adjacent
images to prevent distortion of the between-subjects mask (four partic-
ipants, each accounting for 1% of the total fMRI data). The residual
effects of head motion were also modeled as covariates of no interest in
the analysis by including the six head motion parameters estimated
during realignment. Data were high-pass filtered at 128 s to remove
low-frequency drifts and the statistical model included an AR(1) autore-
gressive function to account for autocorrelations intrinsic to the fMRI
time series. Contrast images were computed to examine the interaction
(agency  probability) and main effects of agency (self  other and
other self) and probability (high low and low high) at the time of
the cue.
Many studies have suggested that situations that involve mixed payoffs
between study participants and other people can result in neural re-
sponses that reflect payoff differences between self and other; that is, they
relate to coding of rewards for self relative for other, often called “ineq-
uity aversion” rather than “vicarious” reward responses (for reviews, see
Ruff and Fehr, 2014; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). To determine whether
identified neural responses to reward predicting cues in the current study
were reflective of coding of rewards for self relative to other, and thus
inequity aversion, we constructed a second model that was the same as
the main model but contained all cues collapsed into a single regressor.
This regressor had two associated parametric modulators. The first
coded the “inequity,” the difference in accumulated reward between self
and other on each trial, and the second coded the agent  probability
interaction. This allowed us to determine neural responses to inequity
and whether any neural responses occurred over and above the variance
explained by inequity.
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Second-level analysis. Second-level analysis was performed using the
standard summary statistics approach to random-effects analysis in
SPM. Contrast images were input into second-level one-sample t test
design matrices. Interactions and main effects are reported at p  0.05,
familywise error (FWE) corrected at the voxel level across the whole
brain. Where significant interactions were identified, we conducted illus-
trative post hoc analyses with simple main effects contrasts using a less
conservative statistical threshold of p 0.001 (uncorrected).
Results
Behavioral data
Participants were highly accurate in their judgments of whether
the outcome was expected or not (mean accuracy 91% for all
participants for both trial types) and missed very few trials (mean
1% for all participants). For mean RTs, a 2 (self vs other) by 2
(win vs no win) ANOVA showed significantly slower judgments
on third-person (M  664 ms, SD  18) than on first-person
(M  649 ms, SD  16) trials (main effect of agency: F(1,29) 
5.32, p  0.03). Judgments were also significantly faster after
reward (641 ms, SD 16) compared with a no reward (672 ms,
SD 19) outcomes (main effect of outcome F(1,29) 14.34, p
0.001). The agency  reward interaction was nonsignificant
(F(1,29) .05, p 0.83).
Given the significant main effect of agency, we calculated the
difference score between self and other RTs to examine associa-
tions between this behavioral measure and empathy. The emo-
tion contagion subscale of the QCAE was positively associated
with the self– other difference score (r 0.49, p 0.01); that is,
participants higher in emotion contagion showed a relative facil-
itation (speeding) when making decisions about the expected-
ness of outcomes for other people (Fig. 1B). No other subscale of
the QCAE correlated with the self-other difference score (all p
0.49). Multiple regression, including all QCAE subscales, showed
that the association between the self– other difference score and
self-reported empathy was specific to the emotion contagion
subscale ( 0.55, SEM 2.43, p 0.01).
fMRI data
Agency probability interaction at time of the cue
To test our first hypothesis, that activity in the ACCg would signal
information about reward probability for others, we examined
the agency probability interaction at the time of the cue. Con-
sistent with our hypothesis, this analysis revealed a significant
effect in the ACCg (MNI coordinates [x 8, y 32, z 12], Z
5.05, k 10, p 0.05 FWE, whole brain corrected), putatively in
area 24a/24b at the border of the midcingulate and anterior
cingulate subregions (Fig. 2). We examined the nature of this
interaction by testing the simple main effects, specifically the con-
trasts of other high versus low probability and self low versus high
probability. Inspection of the other high versus low probability
simple main effect revealed a large cluster in the ACCg overlap-
ping with the region identified in the interaction (MNI coordi-
nates [x  6, y  33, z  12], Z  4.14, k  184, p  0.001,
uncorrected). Inspection of the self low versus high probability
contrast revealed a small cluster of overlapping voxels (MNI co-
ordinates [x  9, y  32, z  13], Z  3.28, k  5, p  0.001,
uncorrected). This suggests that the ACCg activation identified in
the interaction mainly signals the probability of rewards that
would be received by another person.
Associations with trait empathy
To test our second hypothesis, that the extent to which ACCg
responds to the probability of rewards specifically for others
would be positively associated with trait empathy, we used Mars-
BaR (Brett et al., 2002) to extract individual interaction contrast
estimates (other high vs low probability minus self high vs low
probability) from the ACCg cluster identified above and corre-
lated these with participants’ self-reported empathy on the five
QCAE subscales. Emotion contagion was significantly negati-
vely associated with the ACCg interaction contrast estimate
(r	0.45, p 0.01, all other subscales p 0.58) and multiple
regression, including all QCAE subscales, showed that this effect
was specific to emotion contagion (  	.60, SEM  0.062, p 
0.003, all other subscales p 0.15; Fig. 3). In other words, the inter-
action was weakest in individuals high in emotion contagion.
To better understand the nature of this association, we exam-
ined the correlations for other high versus low probability and
self low versus high probability in ACCg with empathy subscales
(Fig. 3). There was no significant correlation between ACCg re-
sponse to other high versus low probability (r	0.05, p 0.81)
and empathy. However, there was a significant negative associa-
tion between ACCg response to self low versus high probability
and emotion contagion (r	0.58, p 0.001); again, multiple
Figure 1. A, Trial structure. Participants performed trials that beganwith a cue signaling the probability of reward (high [80%] or low [20%]) and the agent towhom rewardwould be delivered
(self “you” and other “Lewis” in this example). Participants judged whether the outcome (win 100 points or win 0 points) was expected or unexpected after outcome delivery. Participants
believed that the other participant outside of the scanner was simultaneously performing the same task and that the points they observed would be converted into additional payment at the end
of the experiment for themselves and for the other participant. B, Scatterplot showing association between self– other RT difference at the time of the judgment and trait emotion contagion
(n 30). Overall, participantswere slowerwhenmaking judgments about the expectedness of outcomes for other comparedwith self. However, this effectwas associatedwith emotion contagion
such that those highest in emotion contagion showed a relative speeding of response for other.
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regression demonstrated that this effect was unique to emotion
contagion (  	0.66 SEM  0.082, p  0.001, all other sub-
scales p  0.19). In other words, the extent to which ACCg dis-
tinguished between low and high reward probability for self was
attenuated in individuals with high emotion contagion.
In summary, in individuals with high emotion contagion, the
ACCg signaled information about the relative difference between
high and low probability rewards only for others, whereas in
individuals with low emotion contagion, the ACCg additionally
signaled (negatively) reward probability for self.
Main effects at the time of the cue
The temporal pole showed a significant main effect of other self
(MNI coordinates [33, 22,	26]; Z 4.85; k 2, p 0.05, FWE
whole brain corrected). No other main effects or interactions
survived whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons.
Agency outcome interaction and main effects at the time of
the outcome
No interactions or main effects survived whole-brain correction
for multiple comparisons.
Analysis of inequity aversion
Analysis of the inequity parametric modulator showed no whole-
brain-corrected results and no uncorrected results in ACCg. We
then tested whether our observed effects in the ACCg occurred
over and above any effects of inequity. This analysis showed that
there was still a significant effect in the ACCg after accounting for
the variance explained by inequity (MNI coordinates [x 6, y
32, z  13], Z  4.97, k  8, p  0.05 FWE, whole brain cor-
rected). Therefore, the ACCg response was unlikely to reflect
differences in accumulated reward between self and other.
Discussion
We examined hemodynamic responses in the human brain to
cues that predicted a high or low probability of a reward for
oneself or another person. We show that the ACCg robustly sig-
nals the probability of rewards for another person. This supports
our hypothesis that the ACCg is engaged when processing pre-
dictions about rewards for other people. Our second hypothesis,
that that the extent to which the ACCg is specialized for process-
ing others’ rewards is positively associated with trait empathy,
Figure 2. A, Activation in the ACCg signaled the agency (self vs other) by probability (high [80%] or low [20%]) interaction at the time of the cue [x 8, y 32, z 12], displayed at p 0.001
(uncorrected). B, Parameter estimates for the peak voxel in the ACCg. C, Left, Overlay of the agency probability interaction in ACCg (yellow, as in A). Middle, Only a small number of voxels
overlapped between the interaction contrast (yellow) and the simple main effect of self low versus high probability (blue, k 5 at p 0.001 uncorrected). Right, A large number of voxels
overlapped between the interaction contrast (yellow) and the simple main effect of other high low probability (green, k 184 at p 0.001 uncorrected). Error bars indicate SEM.
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was partially supported. As predicted, the interaction effect in the
ACCg significantly covaried with emotion contagion. However,
this effect was driven by the extent to which ACCg signaled re-
ward predictions for self, not other. Specifically, for those high in
emotion contagion, the ACCg signaled reward prediction exclu-
sively for others, whereas for those low in emotion contagion, this
same region signaled reward prediction for self (in the opposite
direction).
The model of the contributions of ACCg to social cognition
(Apps et al., 2013b) highlights that this region plays an important
role in understanding the value of others’ rewards, and conse-
quently in social behavior (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Behrens et al.,
2008; Jones et al., 2011; Apps et al., 2013a, 2015; Boorman et al.,
2013; Chang et al., 2013; Apps and Ramnani, 2014). This claim is
built upon several lines of evidence. Lesions to this region have
been shown to impair the processing of social stimuli and cause a
reduction in the execution of social behaviors (Rudebeck et al.,
2006). The ACCg is connected to regions that process social in-
formation, but also to regions that process reward-related infor-
mation (Yeterian and Pandya, 1991; Lynd-Balta and Haber, 1994;
Haber et al., 1995). Single-unit recording evidence suggests that a
relatively large proportion of ACCg neurons, compared with
those in other prefrontal regions, respond when a monkey antic-
ipates the delivery of reward to another monkey (Chang et al.,
2013), and human imaging studies have shown that the ACCg
responds when tracking the value of cues predicting approval
from peers (Jones et al., 2011). Together, these studies support
the claim that the ACCg is important for processing others’ re-
wards and also in social behavior. However, a key untested com-
ponent of this model was that the ACCg would be engaged when
processing the likelihood of rewards being delivered to others.
We show for the first time that the ACCg signals the likelihood of
others’ rewards regardless of trait levels of empathy. We also note
that we did not observe responses to reward prediction in other
Figure 3. A, Significant association between the cluster in the ACCg showing the interaction effect and participants’ emotion contagion scores. B, Response to self low high probability
decreases as a function of emotion contagion, with those lowest in emotion contagion showing the greatest response to low high probability of reward for self. C, Response to other high low
probability shows no significant modulation as a function of emotion contagion.
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candidate regions for reward signals, even at uncorrected levels
(e.g., ventral striatum, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and
amygdala; for a meta-analysis, see Morelli et al., 2015), support-
ing some degree of specificity of ACCg response to vicarious
reward in our study.
Our experimental paradigm was designed to ensure that par-
ticipants attended to reward cues. By asking participants to make
a decision at the time of the outcome, we cannot purely assess
whether outcome-related responses are also coded in ACCg be-
cause participants were both processing the outcome and prepar-
ing a motor response during this time. However, there is evidence
that vicarious prediction error signals may well be coded in ACCg
(Apps et al., 2013a, 2015). We provide the first evidence that this
same region also encodes the likelihood of others receiving
rewards.
Although previous studies have suggested the ACCg plays an
important role in empathy (Lamm et al., 2011; Engen and Singer,
2013), these studies have largely focused on neural responses to
others’ pain. Our data suggest that the degree of specialization in
this region’s response to others’ predicted rewards may partly
underlie individual differences in emotion contagion. Emotion
contagion is hypothesized to be a necessary foundation for em-
pathizing with other individuals (Bird and Viding, 2014) and is a
process that is shared with nonhuman animals (for review, see de
Waal, 2008). Importantly, emotion contagion also covaried with
RTs to decisions about rewards delivered to others, with those
highest in trait emotion contagion showing the greatest speeding
of response. A distinction is often made between “affective em-
pathy,” which is commonly understood as an affective state
caused by vicariously processing the experiences of another per-
son, and “cognitive empathy,” which is thought to include pro-
cesses such as perspective taking and theory of mind (Singer and
Lamm, 2009). Regression analyses suggested that only emotion
contagion, part of the “affective” component, was associated with
vicarious reward prediction. In tasks investigating cognitive as-
pects of empathy, an anatomically separate region of the
mPFC, the dorsal mPFC, is often responsive (Amodio and
Frith, 2006), suggesting partially separate functions of the
ACCg and mPFC.
Although we did not predict an association between emotion
contagion and ACCg response to self reward prediction, a possi-
ble explanation relates to the findings of Chang et al. (2013) and
Haroush and Williams (2015). These investigators observed
some self-reward- selective neurons in the same region of the
ACCg/dACC that also contained other-reward-selective neu-
rons, suggesting that some processing of information about re-
wards for self occurs in ACCg. However, given the limited sample
sizes in nonhuman primate studies, the investigators were unable
to examine variability in the proportion of neurons that signaled
self versus other reward. We speculate that, even if at the pop-
ulation level, the ACCg shows a relative specialization in pro-
cessing rewards for others, individual variability in the degree
to which self rewards are also processed in this region could be
important for explaining heterogeneity in ACCg function and
empathy. That is, for those individuals who display the lowest
levels of emotion contagion, there appears to be reduced spe-
cialization and a potentially opposing coding scheme of self
and other reward probability in ACCg. Such opposing coding
within the same anatomical region could have consequences
for understanding social cognition and behavior, such as in-
creased weighting of rewards to self and higher likelihood of
engaging in competitive social interactions.
This interpretation is supported by a recent study finding that
stimulation of dACC neurons made monkeys more competitive
(Haroush and Williams, 2015). Similarly, another study showed
that single neurons in a region of the rat cingulate cortex thought
to be homologous with human dACC coded the value of com-
peting with another rat for rewards (Hillman and Bilkey, 2012).
These findings may help to reconcile previous discrepancies in
the functions that have been imputed to dACC in terms of com-
petitive social behaviors (Hillman and Bilkey, 2012; Haroush and
Williams, 2015), but also empathy (Lamm et al., 2011; Engen and
Singer, 2013). We propose that variability in empathy may mod-
ulate, not only the extent to which social information is processed
in ACCg, as suggested in previous studies and theoretical ac-
counts of empathy (Lamm et al., 2011; Engen and Singer, 2013),
but also the extent to which self and other reward information is
computed. However, this hypothesis requires further testing in
future experiments.
Empathic abilities are a fundamental building block for suc-
cessful social behavior and are at the core of many disorders of
social cognition, including autism and psychopathy (Blair, 2005;
Lockwood et al., 2013a; Bird and Viding, 2014). Previous studies
have suggested that a similar portion of the dACC that was acti-
vated in our study is anatomically and functionally atypical in
individuals with psychopathy and in individuals with autism
(Simms et al., 2009; Brazil et al., 2011; Anderson and Kiehl, 2012;
Delmonte et al., 2013; Lockwood et al., 2013b). Integrating these
previous findings with the present results suggests the hypothesis
that individual differences in the structure, function, and connec-
tivity of the ACCg constrain the extent to which this region pro-
cesses reward-predicting cues for others compared with self,
which may lead to atypical empathic processing. However, we
also know that psychopathy and autism have different profiles of
empathic processing and behavior from one another (Blair, 2005;
Lockwood et al., 2013a; Bird and Viding, 2014). The ACCg has
strong connections to other regions involved in social and reward
processing, including the nucleus accumbens (Yeterian and Pan-
dya, 1991; Lynd-Balta and Haber, 1994; Haber et al., 1995), a
region also suggested to participate in vicarious reward process-
ing (Mobbs et al., 2009; Fareri et al., 2012; Braams et al., 2014), the
temporal poles (which showed greater response to other vs self
reward prediction in our study),and the temporoparietal junc-
tion and paracingulate cortex (Markowitsch et al., 1985; Seltzer
and Pandya, 1989; Barbas et al., 1999). Future research into the
neurocognitive correlates of psychopathy and autism should in-
vestigate whether distinct social behavioral abnormalities can be
characterized by differences in the functional and connectional
fingerprint of the ACCg during vicarious reward processing.
In summary, we demonstrate a central role for the ACCg in
processing predictions about the likelihood of others’ rewards.
We also found substantial individual variation in the degree to
which the ACCg responds to self and other reward, with only
those highest in trait emotion contagion showing specialization
of ACCg for others predicted reward. Together, our findings
highlight the importance of understanding the contributions of
the ACCg to social cognition and how variability in its function
may underlie variability in social behavior.
Notes
Supplemental material for this article is available at http://www.
patricialockwood.co.uk/Publications. In Table 1, we provide uncor-
rected results at the time of the cue (p 0.001, k 10) for completeness.
We note that these results should be interpreted with caution given that
they do not survive correction for multiple comparisons. In Table 2, we
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provide uncorrected results at the time of the outcome (p 0.001, k
10) for completeness. We note that these results should be interpreted
with caution given that they do not survive correction for multiple com-
parisons. This material has not been peer reviewed.
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